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Abstract
Cooperation is fundamental to the evolution of human society. We regularly observe cooperative behaviour in everyday life
and in controlled experiments with anonymous people, even though standard economic models predict that they should
deviate from the collective interest and act so as to maximise their own individual payoff. However, there is typically
heterogeneity across subjects: some may cooperate, while others may not. Since individual factors promoting cooperation
could be used by institutions to indirectly prime cooperation, this heterogeneity raises the important question of who these
cooperators are. We have conducted a series of experiments to study whether benevolence, defined as a unilateral act of
paying a cost to increase the welfare of someone else beyond one’s own, is related to cooperation in a subsequent one-shot
anonymous Prisoner’s dilemma. Contrary to the predictions of the widely used inequity aversion models, we find that
benevolence does exist and a large majority of people behave this way. We also find benevolence to be correlated with
cooperative behaviour. Finally, we show a causal link between benevolence and cooperation: priming people to think
positively about benevolent behaviour makes them significantly more cooperative than priming them to think
malevolently. Thus benevolent people exist and cooperate more.
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Introduction
Two or more people cooperate if they pay an individual cost in
order to increase the welfare of the group. The canonical
economic model, assuming people care only about their own
welfare, predicts that they should not cooperate: the incentive to
minimise individual cost causes people to act selfishly. In reality
the opposite behaviour is often observed. In personal relationships,
workplace collaborations, political participation, and concerning
global issues such as climate change, examples of cooperation are
manifold, and fostering cooperation has been show to have a
number of important applications [1–10].
Classical studies have been focussed on punishing of defectors
[11–14], increasing the reputation of cooperators [3,15,16], and
the interplay between these two mechanisms [17–20]. While these
approaches have been successfully shown to enforce cooperation,
and punishment has been adopted by most countries to sanction
defectors, their weakness is their cost to not only the punisher and
the punished, but to the third party tasked with rewarding those
with increased reputation. The principle is: if we want to increase
cooperation, someone must pay a cost.
In this light, it becomes important to find less expensive ways to
sustain cooperation and it is here that individual factors may play a
crucial role. Assume individual factor X is known to promote
cooperation, then creating an environment which favours factor X
will also promote cooperation. Existence of one or more such
factors is suggested by the numerous experimental studies showing
that humans do tend to behave cooperatively, even in anonymous,
isolated environments where communications or long-term
strategies are not allowed [21–25]. These studies have shown that
humans are heterogeneous: some may cooperate, while others
may not. If so, who are the cooperators?
A growing body of literature is trying to provide answers to this
question, by investigating what factors promote cooperation in
one-shot social dilemma games, such as the Public Goods game
and the Prisoner’s dilemma. In the Public Goods game, N agents
are endowed with y monetary units and have to decide how much,
if any, to contribute to a public pool. The total amount in the pot
is multiplied by a constant and evenly distributed among all
players. So, player i’s payoff is y{xiza(x1z . . .zxN ), where xi
denotes i’s contribution and the ‘marginal return’ a is assumed to
belong to the open interval ( 1
N
, 1). In the Prisoner’s dilemma, two
agents can either cooperate or defect. To cooperate means paying
a cost to give a greater benefit to the other player; to defect means
doing nothing.
While theoretical studies have shown that heterogeneity among
subjects can promote the evolution of cooperation in the spatial
Prisoner’s dilemma and the spatial Public Goods game in a variety
of different settings [26–29], experimental studies have investigat-
ed the role of specific factors, such as intuition and altruism (see
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below for definitions), on cooperation in one-shot anonymous
Public Goods games and Prisoner’s dilemma games [24,30–36].
Intuitive actions are induced by either exerting time pressure on
subjects or priming them towards intuition versus deliberate
reflection [30–33]. While it is generally accepted that intuition
favours cooperation through the Social Heuristics Hypothesis [30],
the correlation between altruism and cooperation is still unclear:
one study did not find any correlation between altruism and
cooperation in a subsequent one-shot Public Goods game [36],
while another study found a positive correlation between altruism
and cooperation in a precedent one-shot Prisoner’s dilemma [24].
Altruism is formally defined as unilaterally paying a cost c§0 to
give a benefit b to another and is traditionally measured using a
Dictator game [24,32,34–37]. Here a dictator is given an
endowment xw0 and must then decide how much, if any, to
donate to a recipient who was given nothing. The recipient has no
input in the process and simply accepts the donation. Givings in
the Dictator game are usually considered as an appropriate
measure of altruism [38–41] and recent experiments have shown
that indeed they positively correlate to altruistic acts in real-life
situations [42].
Experiments on the Dictator game typically present a bimodal
distribution. Participants tend to either act selfishly or act so as to
decrease inequity between players. Consider the scenario where
Player 1 is given $10 dollars and must then decide how much if
any to donate to a second anonymous player. In most cases Player
1 decides to selfishly keep all of the money, or to donate half to
Player 2, and so reduce the inequity between the two players.
There is a third scenario that occurs, although rarely. Here Player
1 decides to donate more to Player 2 than to keep for herself. In
some cases players have been known to donate the entire sum. The
act of increasing the other payoff beyond your own will be called
‘benevolence’. It is likely that this behaviour is not observed more
often in the Dictator game as its design effectively penalises
altruism. If cost were less of a factor perhaps benevolence would be
more prevalent.
In sum, the main difference between cooperation and altruism is
that altruism is unilateral: there is no way to get rewarded.
Another difference is that we allow altruist action at negligible cost.
In other words, the important part is to create a benefit to
someone else without getting anything back. Benevolence is an
extreme form of altruism, where the final result of the act is that
the recipient has a larger payoff of the actor.
Cooperation: Two or more people cooperate if they pay an
individual cost to give a greater benefit to the group.
Altruism: A person acts altruistically if he unilaterally pays a
cost c§0 to increase the benefit of someone else. More formally,
Player 1 is altruist towards Player 2 if he prefers the allocation
(x1{c, x2zb) to the allocation (x1, x2), where c§0 and bw0.
Benevolence: A person acts benevolently if he unilaterally
pays a cost c§0 to increase the benefit of someone else beyond
one’s own. More formally, Player 1 is benevolent towards Player 2
if he prefers the allocation (x1{c, x2zb) to the allocation
(x1, x2), where c§0, bw0, and x2zbwx1{c.
Examples of benevolence in everyday life abound. The sharing
of one’s food causing the sharer to go hungry, campaigning on
behalf of a VIP in order to promote their agenda, or something as
trivial as ‘liking’ or sharing a status on social networks so as to
increase the reputation of another.
In this paper, we have designed a game that allows players to
choose actions that are malevolent, inequity averse or benevolent,
all at minimal cost. More specifically, we give an endowment Lw0
to Player 1 that she keeps regardless of any subsequent choice. She
has to then decide how much, between 0 and H§L to donate to
Player 2. To donate 0 will be referred as a malevolent act; to
donate L will be referred as inequity aversion; to donate more than
L will be referred as benevolence.
This form of benevolence, though costless, increases the
inequity among people and so it is predicted not to exist by the
widely used inequity aversion models [47,48]. Thus, as a first step
of our program, we have conducted an experiment, using this new
economic game, to show that most people act in a benevolent way
even when it is made clear that there is no possibility of an indirect
reward. We next move to investigate our main research question:
Is benevolence one of those individual factors favouring cooper-
ative behaviour? With this is mind, as a second step, we have asked
whether benevolence is correlated to cooperative behaviour. We
have found that benevolence positively correlates with cooperation
in a number of different settings, and with different payoffs.
Finally, in our third study, we have showed the causal link between
benevolence and cooperation: priming people towards benevo-
lence versus malevolence results in a significant increase of
cooperative behaviour.
These results allow us to conclude that benevolence is an
individual factor possessed by many people and that it is among
those factors promoting cooperative behaviour. Although this
observation contradicts inequity aversion models, other theories
could be used to explain it. For instance, the tendency to maximise
the total welfare and adherence to social norms can explain the
existence of benevolence and its correlation with cooperative
behaviour. We refer the reader to the Discussion section for more
details.
Study 1. Benevolence Exists
Inequity aversion models [47,48] are based on the assumption
that humans have a tendency to mitigate payoff differences. Since
benevolence, measured using the game described below, increases
payoff difference between the actor and the recipient, these models
predict that it does not exist. Thus, as a first step of our program,
we make us sure that benevolence does actually exist. Moreover,
we test whether people trust in the benevolence of others and, to
this end, we have introduced a second player who has to gamble
on the first player’s level of benevolence. Among the several
different ways one can formalise this strategic situation through an
economic game, we have adopted a particularly simple one,
formally described below.
BT(L,H): Player 1 is given an amount L§0 of dollars which
she keeps regardless her choice. She then must choose an amount
of dollars between 0 and H§L. Player 2 has to decide a number
between 0 and H, as well. If Player 2’s choice, say t (as in trust), is
smaller than or equal to Player 1’s choice, say b (as in benefit or
benevolence), then Player 2 gets t dollars, otherwise he gets
nothing. So player 1’s decision corresponds to the maximum
amount of dollars she allows player 2 to make, while player 2’s
choice is a measure of his trust in Player 1’s benevolence.
The BT game is similar to the Ultimatum Game with multiplier
kw1 [49]. Here Player 2 decides his minimal acceptable offer
(MAO) and Player 1 decides an offer b [ ½0, 1 to make to Player
2. If MAOv b, then Player 2 earns kb and Player 1 earns 1{b,
otherwise both players earn nothing. However, in the BT game
the payoff of Player 1 is fixed and independent of any profile of
strategies played.
We recruited US subjects to play BT($0:10,$1) using the online
labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk [43–46]. After explain-
ing the rules, we asked a series of comprehension questions to
make sure they understood the game. These questions were
formulated to make very clear the duality between harming and
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favouring the other player at zero cost for themselves. Players
failing any of the comprehension questions were automatically
screened out. We refer the reader to the File S1 for full
experimental instructions.
A total of 247 subjects passed all comprehension questions.
Among the 123 subjects who played as Player 1, we find that only
12 participants chose a strategy bƒ$0:10 (9 malevolent and 3
inequity averse people). All others chose b§$0:40 and about 60%
of the subjects acted in a perfectly benevolent way, choosing b~$1
and so maximising the inequity between themselves and the others
(see Figure 1).
By looking at the 124 subjects who played as Player 2, we find
that subjects tended to trust in the benevolence of others, although
we find a general tendency to underestimate it: while the average
‘benevolence’ was $0:82, the average ‘trust’ was only $0:63. The
Mann-Whitney test confirms that these samples most likely come
from different distributions (Pv:0001). We have also conducted a
similar experiment with BT($0:10,$0:10) with 133 US subjects
acting as Player 1 and 142 as Player 2. By comparing the results in
BT($0:10,$1) with those in BT($0:10,$0:10) we find that, after the
obvious rescaling, benevolence and trust do not seem to depend on
the maximum payout H . (Mann-Whitney test: P~0:538 in case of
benevolence; P~0:981 in case of trust).
Study 2. Benevolence Is Positively Correlated with
Cooperation
To study correlation between cooperation and benevolence,
and cooperation and trust, we designed a battery of four two-stage
games. Participants first played a BT game and then a standard
Prisoner’s dilemma PD(b,c) with cost c~$0:10 and benefit
b~$0:25. In our PD, two players must choose to either either
cooperate or defect: to defect means keeping c, while to cooperate
means giving b to the other player. The strategic situation faced by
the participants is summarised below.
T1. Subjects first play BT($0:10,$0:10) as Player 1 and then
play PD($0:25,$0:10).
T2. Subjects first play BT($0:10,$1) as Player 1 and then play
PD($0:25,$0:10).
T3. Subjects first play BT($0:10,$0:10) as Player 2 and then
play PD($0:25,$0:10).
T4. Subjects first play BT($0:10,$1) as Player 2 and then play
PD($0:25,$0:10).
Again we recruited US subjects using AMT and asked
qualitative comprehension questions to make sure they understood
the game.
A total of 385 subjects, nearly evenly distributed among the four
treatments, passed all comprehension questions. Figure 2 shows
the average benevolence of cooperators and defectors in T1 and
T2. Benevolence seems positively correlated with cooperation in
both treatments. To confirm this, we use logistic regression to
predict defection or cooperation as the dependent variable. We
find that the correlation between benevolence and cooperation is
borderline significant in T1 (coeff~0:175, P~0:054) and
significant in T2 (coeff~0:02, P~0:019). On the other hand,
we find that trust affects cooperation only for H~0:1
(coeff~0:167, P~0:016) and does not for H~1 (coeff~{0:001,
P~0:887).
Study 3. Priming Benevolence Promotes
Cooperation
In the previous studies we have shown that benevolence exists
and is positively correlated to cooperation. Here we show the
causal link between benevolence and cooperation. To do this we
use an experimental design similar to that used in [30] to show the
causal link between intuition and cooperation: we prime
participants towards benevolence or malevolence before playing
a Prisoner’s dilemma. Specifically, we have conducted three more
treatments, as described below.
T5. After entering the game, participants see a screen where we
define benevolence as giving a benefit to someone else at negligible
cost to themselves. Subjects are then asked to write a paragraph
describing a time when acting benevolently led them in the right
direction and resulted in a positive outcome for them. Alterna-
tively, they could write a paragraph describing a time when acting
malevolently led them in the wrong direction and resulted in a
negative outcome for them. After this, they are asked to play
PD($0:25$,0:10).
T6. This treatment is very similar to T5, with the only
difference that subjects are primed towards malevolence. We first
define malevolence as an unkind act towards someone else with no
Figure 1. Distribution of choices in BT($0:10,$1) of those people acting as Player 1. Only 12 out of 123 participants acted in a malevolent or
inequity averse way; all others acted benevolently with a large majority of participants acting in a perfectly benevolent way.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0102881.g001
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immediate benefit for themselves and then we ask participants to
write a paragraph describing a time when acting benevolently led
them in the wrong direction and resulted in a negative outcome for
them. Alternatively, they could write a paragraph describing a
time when acting malevolently led them in the right direction and
resulted in a positive outcome for them.
T7. This is a baseline treatment, where participants enter the
game and are immediately asked to play PD($0:25$,0:10), using
literally the same instructions as in T5 and T6, in order to avoid
framing effects.
Also for this study, we recruited US subjects using AMT. In
order not to destroy the priming effect we decided not to ask for
comprehension questions before the Prisoner’s dilemma in T5 and
T6. Further, we asked no comprehension questions in T7 so as not
to bias any baseline measurement. To control for good quality
results we used other techniques (see File S1 for full experimental
details). In particular, at the end of the experiment we asked the
players to describe the reason of their choice. This, together with
the descriptions of benevolent or malevolent actions, allowed us to
manually exclude from the analysis those subjects who did not take
the game seriously or showed a clear misunderstanding of the rules
of the game, as sometimes happens in AMT experiments. We
excluded from our analysis 11 subjects.
300 US subjects, nearly evenly distributed among the three
treatments, participated to our third study and passed our manual
screening. As Figure 3 shows, the trend is in the expected
direction. 62% of the participants cooperated in T5, far more than
that in T6 (46%). Pearson’s x2 test confirms that the difference is
statistically significant (x2(1)~5:425,P~0:020). The baseline
treatment lies just in between, with a percentage of cooperation
of 58%. However, the difference is not statistically significant
with neither of the other two treatments (T5 vs T7,
x2(1)~0:394, P~0:530; T6 vs T7, x2(1)~2:629, P~0:105).
Discussion
Benevolence, that is paying a (potentially zero) cost to increase
someone else’s welfare beyond that of your own, is predicted not to
exist by the widely used inequity aversion models [47,48], which
are indeed founded on the idea that humans have a tendency to
moderate payoff differences. Contrary to this prediction, our Study
1 shows that most people act in a benevolent way, at least when
the cost of the action is zero, and that most people trust in the
benevolence of others. Existence of benevolence might be seen as
surprising also in light of other experimental results showing that
people are often willing to pay a cost to decrease the benefit of a
richer partner [50]. The explanation of these apparently
contradictory results most likely relies in social norms: most
people think that to be benevolent and to restore equity when a
situation of inequity is artificially presented as status quo without
any reason as in [50] are both the ‘right things to do’.
Looking for individuals factors promoting cooperative behav-
iour, we have then asked whether benevolence is positively
correlated with cooperative behaviour. Our Study 2 shows that:
benevolent people not only exist, but they are more likely to
cooperate in a subsequent Prisoner’s dilemma. This provides
evidence that benevolence is one of those individual factors
favouring cooperation.
Our Study 3 strengthens this conclusion by directly showing a
causal link between benevolence and cooperation. Priming people
to think about benevolence in a positive way or about malevolence
in a negative way makes them significantly more cooperative than
priming them to think about benevolence in a negative way or
about malevolence in a positive way. The fact that the level of
cooperation can experimentally be manipulated in such a way
connects to the important question of whether priming people
towards benevolence can be used for instance by companies as a
way to increase cooperation among employees or by countries to
increase cooperation among citizens, and to what extent.
As we have mentioned, our results are not consistent with
inequity aversion models. However, a number of other theories
could explain both the existence of benevolence and its positive
correlation with cooperative behaviour. Several experimental
studies have shown that many people act so as to maximise the
total welfare [24,51,52] and some of the most recent mathematical
models of human behaviour are indeed based on postulating this
tendency [9,25,51,53]. See [54,55] for a review of other models of
cooperation. This predisposition might explain why benevolent
people exist and are more cooperative: our results might be due to a
number of people attempting to maximise the total welfare. Other
scholars suggest that social norms shape most of cooperative
behaviour [56,57]. Though social norms varies across cultures, it is
Figure 2. Average level of benevolence of cooperators and defectors in T1 and T2, with error bars representing the standard error
of the mean. In both treatments benevolence is positively correlated with cooperation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0102881.g002
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possible that to be benevolent and to be cooperative are both seen as
the ‘right things to do’ by part of the US population. From this
perspective, our results could be driven by a number of people
attempting to act according to the social norm they adhere to.
We conclude by saying that our results do not imply that
defectors are never benevolent. As Figure 2 shows, defectors were
substantially more benevolent than predicted by inequity aversion
models, but significantly worse than cooperators. Benevolence thus
seems far more transversal than cooperation and suggests the
following question. What evolutionary pressures select for benev-
olence? Together with the aforementioned theories, several others,
such as warm-glow giving [58] and the Social Heuristics
Hypothesis [30], offer qualitative explanations. Andreoni’s
warm-glow giving theory states that (some) humans receive utility
from the fact itself of giving; the SHH instead builds on the idea
that everyday life interactions are often repeated and a benevolent
act today may be rewarded tomorrow. It is then possible that
people internalise benevolence in their everyday life and use it as a
default strategy in the lab.
In conclusion, we have found that benevolence exists and it is
positively correlated to cooperation. However, the ultimate reason
why benevolence exists and why it is correlated with cooperation is
far from being clear. It is therefore an important question for
further research and is likely to be challenging because it clearly
connects to some of the most basic open problems of human social
behaviour.
Materials and Methods
We recruited US subjects using Amazon Mechanical Turk and
randomly assigned them to one of seven experiments using economic
games. Treatments are described in the Main Text and full
instructions are given in the File S1. In four treatments, participants
were informed that comprehension questions would be asked after
the instructions of each game and that they would be automatically
eliminated if they failed to correctly answer them. Comprehension
questions were formulated in such a way to make very clear the
duality between harming and favouring the other player (in case of
the BT game), and between maximising one’s own payoff and
maximising the total welfare (in case of the PD). A total of 385
subjects passed all comprehension questions. Participants were also
informed that computation and payment of the bonuses would be
made at the end of the experiment. So, importantly, in each
treatment, participants played the second game without knowing the
outcome of the first. The structure of the remaining three treatments
was such that we could not ask for comprehension questions.
However, to control for good quality result we used other techniques,
such as asking participants to describe the strategy used. This allowed
us to manually eliminate from the analysis those people who showed
a clear misunderstanding of the game rules. No deception was used.
Written consent was obtained by all participants, and the
experiments were approved by the Southampton University Ethics
Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research. For further
details of the experimental methods, see File S1.
Supporting Information
File S1 Experimental setup.
(PDF)
Figure 3. Average cooperation in each of the three treatments. Participants primed to act benevolently were significantly more likely to
cooperate than than those primed to act malevolently. The level of cooperation of unprimed participants lies between those of the primed groups
and cannot be statistically separated from either.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0102881.g003
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